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Abstract: In the texts in which Immanuel Kant discusses the principles
governing international relations—including texts explicitly dealing with the
sources leading states to armed conflict and the circumstances enabling its
cessation—he does not directly engage the question “What constitutes victory
in war?” This should not be surprising, given that Kant’s treatment of war
may be read as consonant with just war thinking for which victory seems an
unproblematic concept Yet there are elements in the tone and the substance
of his discussion that destabilize a placement of his views as
unproblematically part of that tradition. The mordant tone of his dismissal of
the Realpolitik guiding “political moralists” suggests a trenchant skepticism
about almost any justification offered for leading a state into war. More
substantively, an antinomy is at work in the contrast Kant makes, in the two
sets of articles for perpetual peace, between a “state of nature” that,
construed from the standpoint of the theoretical use of reason, defines the
order of international relations as necessarily one of constant war, and the
radical transformation of that order, enacted by moral reason in the definitive
articles of perpetual peace, into a cosmopolitan order that heeds the
categorical imperative “there shall be no war.” In consequence, one may
construct a Kantian answer to the question “What constitutes victory in war?”
by framing it in reference to this cosmopolitan hope for an international order
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securing enduring peace. Within the moral horizon of cosmopolitan hope,
victory in war—like war itself—is unmasked as morally unintelligible.
Keywords: Victory; War; Perpetual peace; Kant; Categorical imperative;
Practical reason

In the various texts in which he discusses the principles that
should govern relations among nations, including the texts in which he
explicitly deals with the circumstances and the motivations that lead
states to engage one another in armed conflict and the circumstances
that enable its cessation, Immanuel Kant does not directly engage the
question “What constitutes victory in war?”1 This should not be all that
surprising: There is much in Kant’s account of war as ingredient in the
dynamics of the political order of sovereign states and in his proposal
for instituting a federation of states as the basis for an international
order conducive to the securing of perpetual peace that can be read as
consonant with the main elements of “just war” thinking, for which
victory has not ordinarily loomed as a problematic concept.
Yet beneath what initially looks like an unremarkable
endorsement of the just war principles that in Kant’s time were already
emerging as a substantive moral point of reference for international
law, there are elements in both the tone and the substance of his
discussion that destabilize too easily placing his views as
unproblematically part of that tradition. The tone of mordant irony
that, in Perpetual Peace, pervades his treatment of war, most notably
in his treatment of the “principles” by which “political moralists” justify
the use of force as an instrument of policy in an international order
that they view as Hobbes’s “state of nature” writ large, manifests a
trenchant skepticism about almost any justification offered for leading
a state into war.2 More substantively, there is also a destabilizing
complexity to the conceptual landscape of international conflict and its
resolution that he maps in the arguments put forth in Perpetual Peace
and which are complemented by discussions in other texts, such as
The Metaphysics of Morals, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere
Reason, the second essay in The Conflict of the Faculties, and the third
part of the essay “Theory and Practice.”
This complexity arises not simply from the challenge of
attempting to articulate an account of Kant’s definitive view of the
moral status of war from a set of texts, published between 1784 and
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1798, that give evidence of shifts and developments in his thinking.3 It
also arises from the tensions built into fundamental structure of his
overall critical philosophy. This tension has its specific locus in the “two
standpoints,” the theoretical and the practical, that he takes to be
necessarily embedded in the uses of human finite reason as it seeks to
render intelligible our human engagement with the world.4 Even as
Kant resolutely maintains that these standpoints function within the
unity of one and the same reason, this does not prevent him from
unflinching recognition that, to the extent that human reason remains
uncritical, i.e., undisciplined by a consciously appropriated awareness
of the limits set by reason’s finitude, these two standpoints will
present themselves to us in the form of seemingly irreconcilable
antinomies for our efforts to render the world intelligible.
For Kant, human reason’s drive to “make sense of” what it is to
be human, provides the fundamental thrust and trajectory to his
critical project. Kant argues that antinomies arise within this drive to
make sense of the human when human reason steps beyond the limits
that constrain its legitimate exercise for theoretical cognition to the
conditions of space and time, which provide parameters for the causal
necessity that renders intelligible the empirical workings of world. In
stepping beyond those limits, theoretical reason ventures into a field in
which intelligibility is not a function of causal necessity but a function
rather of the agential freedom for determining ends that Kant calls
moral autonomy. This field is properly the domain for the exercise of
the practical use of reason. Kant further argues that, relative to each
other, it is the practical use of reason that has primacy above its
theoretical use with respect to the overarching “interest” of reason in
rendering intelligible the human place in the cosmos. Within this
framework, antinomies can thus be seen to arise in consequence of
giving unreflective primacy to the empirical intelligibility arising from
the theoretical use of reason in place of the reflective moral primacy
that arises from the enactments of the practical use of reason. Once
such antinomies are recognized, they can then be resolved by an
effective recognition of the primacy of reason’s moral use.
It may initially seem that the overarching issue of the unity of a
human reason that functions both theoretically and practically within
the structure of Kant’s critical enterprise may have little direct bearing
upon constructing a plausible Kantian response to the specific question
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“What does it meant to win a war?” let alone upon resolving the thorny
questions raised by his proposals for an international cosmopolitan
order that envisions the cessation of war as its moral outcome. My
argument in this essay, nonetheless, will begin from a suggestion that
we can, in fact, locate such an antinomy at work in Kant’s account of
the moral dynamics by which human moral agency is empowered to
transform what appears to be the (theoretical) inevitability of war
within an international “state of nature” into the moral possibility of
establishing a world order for enduring peace. My suggestion is that
this antinomy functions specifically in the relationship between what he
calls the “preliminary” and the “definitive” articles for perpetual peace.
This relationship, particularly with respect to the mode of transition
from the former to the latter, is not fully articulated in Kant’s text; my
proposal is that, given the larger framework of Kant’s understanding of
the workings of reason, we attempt to read this relationship in terms
of the dynamics of the tension between the two standpoints of human
finite reason, theoretical and practical, that give rise to the antinomies
that mark human reason’s “peculiar fate” in the absence of the
discipline of self-limitation he terms “critique.”5
Within this reading, the intelligibility of the “preliminary” articles
stands within the ambit of a theoretical standpoint for which war is a
necessary and inevitable outcome of a lawless “state of nature” among
sovereign nations; the intelligibility of the “definitive articles,” in
contrast, arises from the standpoint of the exercise and the primacy of
practical (moral) reason, for which the definitive cessation of war is a
possibility that human agency is called upon to effect in response to
the categorical imperative “there shall be no war.”6 This moral
possibility for the definitive cessation of war is one that stands beyond
the ambit of the intelligibility provided by the theoretical standpoint, in
that both its intelligibility and its enactment are mutually a function of
human moral freedom, exercised as the practical use of reason, not
the outcome of the inexorable casual workings of the world that are
decipherable by reason’s theoretical use.
How, then, does this account of the origin and resolution of such
antinomies help to articulate the relationship between the
“preliminary” and the “definitive” articles that Kant proposes in
Perpetual Peace? The answer to this question lies, I suggest, in
coordinating the distinction between these articles with the distinction
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Kant makes between “the moral politician” and the “political moralist”
in the first Appendix in the essay. The preliminary articles are
preliminary inasmuch as—in the absence of the effective enactment of
the definitive articles—their intelligibility can be rendered adequately in
terms of the theoretical use of reason. They can all be adopted on the
basis of a calculating political prudence—such as that used by the
“political moralist”—in which each state continues to reserve the
possibility of making its own interest ultimately and solely decisive.
The resolution of this antinomy depends upon an acknowledgment of
primacy of reason’s moral use; in this case, it is “moral politician,” not
the “political moralist,” who is in a position to make such an
acknowledgment. Such acknowledgment consists in giving decisive
weight to the categorical imperative, “there shall be no war,” and it is
only in virtue of such an acknowledgment that the transition from the
first to the second set of articles can be concretely navigated by
sovereign nations. Only moral, not prudential, grounds stand sufficient
for establishing the enduring peace that definitively enacts the
categorical imperative “there shall be no war.”
In consequence, the contrast Kant draws between the “moral
politician” and the “political moralist” is crucial to the resolution of this
antinomy, inasmuch as only the former stands ready to enact the
primacy of moral reason in the concrete exercise of the political
judgments needed to bring the definitive articles into effect. The
substance and the tone of Kant’s dismissal of the Realpolitik that
guides “political moralists” even as they pay lip service to principles of
constitutional law and international order is thus one marker of the
tension of this underlying antinomy. This antinomy lies between a
“state of nature” that, as construed from the standpoint of the
theoretical use of reason, defines the extant order of international
relations as necessarily and evermore one of constant war, and the
radical transformation of that order, enacted by the exercise of moral
reason in the definitive articles for perpetual peace, into a
cosmopolitan order that heeds the categorical imperative “there shall
be no war.” In the first, “it is absolutely clear that the right to go to
war surfaces only in the tense and unstable condition of the absence of
the full recognition of law amongst states…it is simply a right in the
absence of right” (Williams 2012); in the second, the transformation of
that order is such that it provides “conditions under which states would
come to abandon war altogether as the means for settling disputes
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about their rights” (Covell 1998). Within this context, it may not be
far-fetched to suggest that the transition from the preliminary to the
definitive articles has a precondition that human beings as political
agents and actors undergo “a revolution in the disposition of [their]
human being” that is the counterpart of the “revolution” that Kant sees
requisite for each human moral agent’s overcoming of “radical evil”.7
In other words, the “political moralist” needs to be moved to
undertake a moral transformation that will make her a “moral
politician.”
Taken together, these elements suggest the presence of a
trajectory in Kant’s thinking about war that stands athwart just war
thinking, a trajectory that arises from his account of the principles of
human moral self-governance (i.e., autonomy) that are operative in
the practical use of reason. This trajectory, moreover, is one that
provides a fundamental orientation for Kant’s understanding of the
responsibility human agents have, as autonomous participants in the
shaping of history, for establishing, through the exercise of practical
reason, the social, political, and cultural conditions of a cosmopolitan
international order that will make it possible to bring about lasting
peace among nations. It will be this cosmopolitan trajectory of
enacting the primacy of practical reason in history that provides the
basis for what I will argue may be appropriately called a Kantian moral
“deconstruction” of the concept of “victory” in its common usage in
political, military, and diplomatic discourse to mark the cessation of
combat that ensues upon the military and political capitulation of one
side to the other.
In order to set out the contours of such a Kantian
“deconstruction” it will be useful first to note that this cosmopolitan
trajectory toward the historical enactment of the primacy of practical
reason suggests that any endorsement that Kant makes of just war
principles is, at best, a function of what he sees as only provisional
steps within the working of human history in the direction of the
establishment of an international order that will provide definitive
conditions for securing perpetual peace.8 Prior to the establishment of
those conditions, wars—and, consequently, the characterization of
victory in a war—occur as (and have their theoretical intelligibility as)
events that are woven into the conflictual fabric of human social
interaction in history. According to Kant’s account of these provisional
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steps, humans first find themselves in a (juridical) “state of nature”
that is marked by contention with one another. It should be noted that
Kant’s account of this state of nature as a “state of externally lawless
freedom”9 does not unconditionally endorse the totally self-regarding
anthropological presuppositions embedded in the Hobbesian rendering
of this state of as bellum omnium contra omnes. Even so, Kant does
take emulation, competition, and invidious comparison, which he
emblematically renders as “unsocial sociability,” to be a social dynamic
powerful enough regularly to bring about conflicts that require external
constraint for their resolution. Although these are conflicts between
individuals, not states, Kant does not hesitate to name them “war.”
Bringing these conflicts to an end requires bringing individuals,
coercively if necessary, into the civil order of a particular state that, by
framing laws according to the “principle of right,”10 provides
enforceable rules for the external governance of the mutual exercise of
human freedom in order to limit and adjudicate such conflicts. One
consequence is that what might have been considered the “victory” of
one party over another in the context of physical contention in the
state of nature, is now transposed into an adjudicatory context of a
court of law in which a third party with civil jurisdiction determines the
outcome.
Bringing individuals into a “juridico-civil” state is thus just the
initial stage in Kant’s account of the steps that lead to the
establishment of the social conditions under which it become possible
for the exercise of human practical reason to be an effective agency in
the establishment of the cosmopolitan world order to bring about the
perpetual peace that Kant considers the “highest political good” for
humanity.11 The civil order that a state establishes to bring individuals
out of state of nature in which civil adjudication replaces physical
contention among those individuals does not, however, also provide
conditions that are sufficient to resolve conflicts that arise between
and among states. In fact, Kant considers the condition that exists
among the various juridico-civil states to constitute an international
state of nature in which war is the default position. This international
state of nature is one that he describes as significantly more
challenging to alter than the one that existed between individuals prior
to the establishment of civil society. This is so because he sees no
authority higher than that of the sovereignty of each individual state
that could legitimate the coercive means that would be needed to
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bring states together into the international counterpart of a juridicocivil state.12 As a result the fundamental “right” that nations exercise
within this condition can be nothing other than a “right of war”:
The public right of states (jus publicum civitatum) in their
relations to one another is what we have to consider under the
designation of the “Right of Nations.” Wherever a state, viewed as a
moral person, acts in relation to another existing in the condition of
natural freedom, and consequently in a state of continual war, such
right takes it rise.13
Within this condition of an international state of nature, “victory”
in a particular war between contending states becomes an outcome
that has an inherent instability to it. Kant understands the dynamics at
work between nations in this condition to be such that both victors and
vanquished, in the absence of any constraining force, will, upon
agreement to a treaty concluding the current war, immediately begin
to take preparatory steps for resuming armed hostilities, if not with
one another, then with some other state considered ripe for
confrontation and conquest. What Kant calls the Preliminary Articles
for perpetual peace thus do not address themselves directly to this
baseline condition of international lawlessness; they are proposed
primarily in the hope that their acceptance will then make possible the
further steps required, under the Definitive Articles, for nations to exit
from this condition.14 The preliminary steps thus function as precepts
which accord with a prudential judgment that bears upon each state’s
assessment of what is efficacious for its self-interest. Unlike the
Definitive Articles, however, they do not arise in function of the hope
for moral efficacy in establishing conditions for perpetual peace that
the exercise of practical reason makes possible in providing a
cosmopolitan perspective upon the historical trajectory of human
action. Put in terms of the antinomy that structures their relation, the
theoretical intelligibility of the Preliminary Articles, while sufficient to
provide precepts for prudential calculation of policies that serve a
state’s interest, any or all of which may be in accord with moral
principles, does not provide those articles—let alone the Definitive
Articles—with an adequate and appropriate moral intelligibility. The
requisite moral intelligibility can only be provided in function of the
acknowledgment of the primacy of practical reason, an
[Citation Journal/Monograph Title, Vol XX, No. XX (m yyyy): pg. XX-XX. DOI. This article is © [Publisher’s Name] and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. [Publisher’s Name] does not grant
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from
[Publisher’s Name].]

8

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

acknowledgment that is performed in the recognition and enactment of
the categorical imperative “there shall be no war.”
There thus are elements in Kant’s presentation of these
preliminary articles that, even in view of their primarily theoretical and
prudential character, can be construed to bear upon the question of
what constitutes victory. Of most general significance in this regard is
that these six articles presuppose the continuing operation of the
conflictual dynamics of the international state of nature. Under these
articles, the basic structural circumstances of the “international state
of nature”—i.e., individual sovereign states “independent of external
laws”15—remain in place, including its motivational dynamics of
prudently exercised and theoretically justified national self-interest.
The articles are framed to regulate a set of conditions likely to bring on
new (or renewed) armed hostilities, but they do not aim at altering the
fundamental conditions of the international state of nature; in
consequence, the arguments Kant offers on their behalf do not directly
appeal, as do the arguments he offers for the Definitive Articles, to the
self-governing moral freedom (autonomy) that is the most basic of
Kant’s moral principles. His arguments for the preliminary articles are
thus couched in terms that, even as they reference important moral
considerations, also recognize the decisive operative weight that that
pragmatic and prudential considerations of national interest continue
to play in the international state of nature, even with the adoption of
these preliminary articles.
Of specific note with respect to the significance and meaning of
“victory,” moreover, is the first article, “No Treaty of Peace Shall Be
Held Valid in Which There Is Tacitly Reserved Matter for a Future War,”
that bears directly upon the possibility and effectiveness of peace
treaties, which are presumed to be the instruments that formalize
terms of victory and defeat. Kant remarks that, in the absence of the
first article, “a treaty would be only a truce, a suspension of
hostilities.”16 Yet Kant does not then conclude that a peace treaty that
observes the terms of this first article would thereby have the effect of
securing lasting peace. Rather, any “victory” that is secured in a such
peace treaty, even if it is a settlement reached after an (ex hypothesi)
justly declared war that is both waged justly and then meets the
conditions for what Kant considers a just mode for its termination, still
stands within the ambit of an international order that, even under the
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Preliminary Articles, remains “only the negative surrogate of an
alliance that averts war”17 in which no such “victory” can stand as
definitive.18
This point is of direct significance for engaging Kant’s account
with the question “What does it mean to win a war?” Kant’s attribution
of a provisional status to “victory,” so long as the international state of
nature obtains, is a function of the way he places his understanding of
the moral status and historical significance of war and, a fortiori, of
victory in war, within the larger lineaments of his account of human
moral life. In that account, the standpoint that the practical (moral)
use of our human reason enables us to take upon the trajectory of
humanity’s moral vocation in history toward securing lasting peace is
central to Kant’s analysis and assessment of the politics and the
morality of war and its outcomes. I will thus propose that we turn
again to situating Kant’s discussions of war within that larger context
of the practical use of our human reason, which provides the basis
from which to elaborate what amounts to Kant’s deconstruction of
“victory” in war, particular with respect to any substantive moral
weight that we might be tempted to attach to this concept. Central to
that deconstruction will be the conceptual coordinates provided by
Kant’s account of the cosmopolitan perspective that moral reason
enables us to take upon the workings of history and upon the outcome
of human action as ingredient in giving shape and direction to
history.19 These coordinates are central to articulating the import of
the structural framework of national and international governance that
the three Definitive Articles propose as the catalyst for transforming
the international state of nature into a cosmopolitan world order in
which, because there are no wars, “victory” has ceased to be a
functioning concept in the discourse of international relations.
The main coordinates will be provided, not surprisingly, by the
taxonomy according to which Kant takes human finite reason to
function as the principle for the two fundamental ways, i.e., by our
thinking and by our action, in which we address the challenge to make
sense of the world. In Kant’s terminology, one way, the way of
thinking, is exhibited in the speculative (theoretical) use of our reason,
the other way, the way of action, is exhibited in the practical (moral)
use of our reason. Kant further posits that, even though these ways
are irreducible to one another, they stem from a single source, the
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dynamism of our reason (which he terms the “interest of reason”) to
render intelligible, both for our thinking and for our acting, the world
we engage and our human place in that world. Kant elaborates this
taxonomy in his three major works of “critique”—the Critique of Pure
Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique of
Judgment—published between 1781 and 1790. Although a key aspect
of the taxonomy he enunciates in those works is the primacy that he
assigns to the workings of the practical (moral) use of reason, there
are important implications of that primacy that emerge with full force
and clarity only in texts that have often been relegated by later
commentators to peripheral status relative to the three Critiques.
These texts include a number of the occasional essays on culture,
history, and politics that he published beginning in the mid-1780s as
well as major texts from the 1790s such as Religion within the
Boundaries of mere Reason and The Metaphysics of Morals. A
particularly important set of implications that emerge in these later
writings help to articulate the role that the practical use of reason
takes in shaping the socio-cultural, historical, and political contours of
humanity’s world to accord with what Kant calls a “cosmopolitan point
of view.”
Within Kant’s taxonomy of reason, the perspective that exhibits
the theoretical use of reason takes the array of socio-cultural and
political dynamics constituting human history as the outcome of forces
functioning in modes of natural causality that proceed on a course
indifferent to individual and collective human intentionality and
purposes. This perspective takes the outcome and direction of history
to issue from the intersection of contingent causal processes within
which free human determination of action has no distinctive place;
human action in and upon history is, at best, simply one other causal
process at work in a field that has no overarching inner directionality,
save that which issues from the intersecting vectors of those causal
processes, including those intertwined with the promotion of the selfinterest that is a natural function of human inclinations. From such a
perspective, we stand as spectators before whom events unfold from
dynamisms upon which we have no distinctive point of purchase. Such
a theoretical perspective comports well with the dynamisms that Kant
describes functioning within the international state of nature. Their
inevitable outcome is a constant state of war and of preparation for
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war in which the single operative “right” that can function as “a law of
nations” is a “right to war.”
Kant’s description of these dynamics, especially in Perpetual
Peace, is cast in ironic tone that occasionally sounds a sardonic note.
After noting that the “concept of a law of nations as a right to make
war does not really mean anything” he adds “[t]he only conceivable
meaning of such a law of nations might be that it serves men right
who are so inclined that they should destroy each other and thus find
perpetual peace in the vast grave that swallows both the atrocities and
their perpetrators.”20 While there is a Hobbesian resonance to this
remark, Kant does not offer it in support of resignation to the
continuance of the international order as a “state of nature” in which
war is the constant and inevitable outcome. This remark enunciates,
instead, a mordant counterpoint to the cosmopolitan perspective,
which on Kant’s account makes possible a transformative
reconceptualization of “the law of nations” into an order of hospitality
that will radically undermine any moral legitimacy to the possibility of
war. What thus had been the sole international right of the law of
nations in an international state of nature, i.e., the “right to make
war,” is superseded in a cosmopolitan world order by “the right to
cosmopolitan hospitality.”21
The basis on which Kant proposes such a radical reconstitution
of international order is moral, rather than prudential. This basis is
found the practical (moral) exercise of our reason, inasmuch as it
pronounces—and human moral agents heed—its “irresistible veto
‘there is to be no war.’”22 Heeding that injunction of reason as a
categorical imperative makes possible the cosmopolitan hope,
validated in the exercise of moral reason, that human efforts can be
effective in establishing conditions for lasting peace. Such
cosmopolitan hope, moreover, is social: it provides agents with a way
to envision the exercise of their freedom not simply as it bears upon
their own individual moral destiny but also upon the social outcomes of
history and culture.23 It thereby enables them to envision the highest
good attained through human freedom to pertain to humanity as a
whole, to humanity as a socially and historically situated species, not
merely to individual human agents.24
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What bearing does this then have on the prospect of framing a
plausible Kantian answer to the question “What constitutes victory in
war?” The fundamental import of placing the question about the
meaning of victory within the horizon of a cosmopolitan hope is that it
indicates that such an answer would be most appropriately framed in
reference the establishment of an international order for enduring
peace secured within the moral horizon of the Definitive Articles,
rather than within the theoretical and prudential horizon offered in the
Preliminary Articles. As a result, Kant’s answer would thus not be
referenced to “just war” principles that seem to remain operative
under the Preliminary Articles. Within the prudential horizon of those
articles, victory bears only the conventional, prudential meaning of the
cessation of hostilities by the military and political capitulation of one
of the parties to the armed conflict. In contrast, when “victory” is
instead viewed within the horizon of the moral possibility for the end of
war that is provided by a cosmopolitan hope in the efficacy of human
action for securing perpetual peace, it undergoes a definitive moral
deconstruction. As it does to war itself, a cosmopolitan perspective
unmasks victory in war as morally unintelligible.
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Notes
1

2

3

4

Among the key texts dealing with war are “Idea for a Universal History from
a Cosmopolitan Point of View” (1784), “On the Common Saying: That
May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of no Use in Practice” (1793),
Perpetual Peace (1795), The Metaphysics of Morals; The Doctrine of
Right (1797), and “An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race
Constantly Progressing?” (1798). Page references to Kant’s text are to
appropriate volume and page numbers in the standard German critical
edition of his works, Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd 1–22 hrsg. von
der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (1900–), usually
referenced as the Akademie-Ausgabe (AA), and currently published by
De Gruyter, Berlin. Page references to the Critique of Pure Reason are
to the original pagination of the 1st (A) and the 2nd (B) editions of the
Critique. English translations are from the appropriate volume of The
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and
Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1995–).
Most notably in Perpetual Peace, Appendix I: On the Opposition between
Morality and Politics with Respect to Perpetual Peace. He draws a
distinction in this section between the “moral politician…who so
chooses political principles that they are consistent with those of
morality” and the “political moralist…who forges a morality in such a
way that it conforms to the statesman’s advantage” (AA 8:372).
It may be useful to note that this essay does not claim to present Kant’s
“definitive view” about what constitutes victory in war, especially since
it is a question he neither frames nor explicitly addresses. This essay
presents, instead, an exploration of consequences for Kant’s account
of war and the place of “victory” in war that would follow from giving
interpretive primacy to the most fundamental moral claim he makes
with respect to war. That claim is that “there shall be no war” is a
categorical imperative to be constantly heeded by the human moral
subjects whose agency gives human society its concrete historical
shape.
This reading of the “two standpoints” is part of a larger interpretive account
of Kant’s critical project in which the fundamental dynamic of human
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reason is construed in anthropological terms: human finite reason is
constituted by a drive to render intelligible, to “make sense of,” what it
is to be human. A provocative discussion of this anthropological thrust
in the critical enterprise can be found in Neiman (1994), Chapter 5,
“The Task of Philosophy,” 185–206.
5
Kant speaks of reason’s “peculiar fate” in the first sentence of the Preface to
the 1st edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, A vii.
6
Two key passages in which Kant identifies “there shall be no war” as a
categorical imperative are found in Perpetual Peace (AA 8: 355–356)
and The Metaphysics of Morals (AA 6: 354–355).
7
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, AA 6: 47.
8
See Mertens (2012) for a probing criticism of efforts that have been made to
place Kant squarely within the traditions of just war thinking. A more
extensive treatment of Kant’s relationship to just war thinking that
also disputes his placement within that tradition is Howard Williams,
Kant and the End of War: A Critique of Just War Theory. Williams
notes at the outset (p. 3) that “one of [his] major concerns is to reestablish Kant’s reputation as a critic of just war thinking.”
9
The Metaphysics of Morals: Doctrine of Right §42, “The Postulate of Public
Right” (AA 6: 307–308).
10
This principle, as enunciated in The Metaphysics of Morals is: “Every action
is right which in itself, or in the maxim on which it proceeds, is such
that it can co-exist along with the freedom of the will of each and all
inaction, according to a universal law” (AA 6: 230).
11
The Metaphysics of Morals: Doctrine of Right, Conclusion (AA 6: 355).
12
There has been a long standing discussion among commentators about
whether Kant takes the definitive form of the relation among states
needed to provide conditions for perpetual peace to be a confederation
in which individuals states retain sovereignty or a single world state.
One recent attempt to chart the varied readings that Kant’s views have
been given from the mid-nineteenth century onward is Easley (2004).
Kleingeld (2012), Chapter 3, “Kant and Cloots on global peace,” 40–
71, provides a useful account of the development of Kant’s thinking on
this point.
13
Metaphysics of Morals, §53, AA 6: 343.
14
My discussion here elides over a significant question about the relationship
between Kant’s presentation of two sets of “Articles” for perpetual
peace in his 1795 essay and his later, condensed presentation of 1797
in §61 of The Metaphysics of Morals: The Doctrine of Right (AA 6:
350–351) of his proposal for a permanent congress of nations as the
vehicle for perpetual peace in which there is no mention of
“preliminary articles.” Williams, Kant and the End of War, extensively
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15
16
17
18

19

20

21
22
23

24

discusses the overlap and the differences between these two texts in
Chapters 2–5, 40–112.
Perpetual Peace, AA 8: 354.
Perpetual Peace, AA 8: 343.
Perpetual Peace, AA 8: 357.
A crucial difference between the two sets of articles—though one that Kant
does not explicitly state—is that compliance with all (or any) of the
preliminary articles does not require that the state that agrees to them
has a republican form of polity. The importance of this difference for
the transformational character of the definitive articles is underscored,
I believe, by the fact that the first of the Definitive Articles is: “The
Civil Constitution of Every State Should Be Republican” (AA 8: 349).
For further discussion of Kant’s cosmopolitanism as a practical (moral)
perspective on the efficacy of human action in history see, Rossi
(2008, 2013).
AA 8: 357. The play on the word “right” is in the original; the vast grave is
an allusion back to the image with which Kant begins the essay: a
graveyard that a Dutch innkeeper used on the sign for his
establishment (AA 8: 343).
The Metaphysics of Morals: The Doctrine of Right, §62 (AA 6: 352–353).
AA 6: 354.
To the extent that Kant’s account invests the agency of the state in respect
to the international order in the sovereign ruler, it is the sovereign who
then has primary responsibility for a social envisioning that accords
with the moral hope that a cosmopolitan perspective offers. This is one
of the features of Perpetual Peace that suggests that a key part of the
audience for this essay that Kant had in view were the monarchs of
Europe, perhaps in the hope of inviting their transformation from
“political moralists” into “moral politicians.”
To the extent that the highest good, as it pertains to individuals, consists in
forming a “good will,” it may be construed, as G. Felicitas Munzel
argues in Kant’s Conception of Moral Character (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1999), to be the shaping of one’s good moral character.
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